Contributor: In negotiations with Iran, the White House's military options are diminishing


With no breakthrough between the United States and Iran in Islamabad last weekend, President Trump is turning to his tool of choice: the US military. Last week he promised to keep US forces in the region at a high level and restart firing (“bigger, better and stronger than anyone has seen before”).

Last Wednesday, at the Pentagon's post-ceasefire briefing, Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a similar threat: “A ceasefire is a pause, and the joint force remains ready, if ordered or requested, to resume combat operations with the same speed and precision we have demonstrated over the past 38 days.” As of 10 a.m. Monday, the U.S. military is implementing a “naval blockade” of ships traveling to or from Iranian ports. This is one step away from returning to total war; Iran has the next step.

But America's domestic appetite for more war is low and the costs are very high. Iran's surviving leaders know this and have learned to survive American military power. Trump should not have expected the ceasefire talks to achieve much more than a cessation of hostilities in the short term. Unsurprisingly, Iranian negotiators are leaning toward prolonging the talks, recognizing that the longer the respite from US-Israeli attacks and Iranian retaliation from the daily cycle lasts, the more difficult it will be to restart fighting.

Meanwhile, the United States will have to deal with the cost of maintaining two aircraft carriers in the Middle East, two Marine Expeditionary Units, hundreds of fighter jets, the headquarters of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and countless logistics capabilities deployed on the front lines, all of which forces difficult budgetary and military trade-offs. The American temptation to withdraw some of these forces will only grow, especially as Congress grapples with the cost of war, military planners are held accountable for wear and tear on critical platforms, and high energy prices add to defense budget woes.

For the United States, the strategic benefits to be gained from further strikes are increasingly diminishing, despite the impressive military achievements of the United States and Israel inside Iran. Trump faces deep public distaste for the war, midterm elections looming in November, spiraling financial costs domestically and globally, erosion of U.S. warfighting capabilities, depleted ammunition stockpiles, and strains on regional air defense assets. Its military options are bleak.

Iran views its negotiating position very differently. The surviving members of his regime will use the ceasefire to reestablish themselves. Without fear of Israeli decapitation attacks, they will meet in person, move around the country, reestablish control and regroup militarily. The United States and Israel will not be able to simply resume the war where it left off. The enemy will adapt.

Trump can hope that, as Iran takes stock of the damage done to its conventional capabilities (and as the economic costs of the naval blockade rise), it will realize its internal vulnerability and weakness and seek a quick solution at the negotiating table. But Trump has already implicitly endorsed Iran's ultimate asymmetric influence: Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The regime has been coordinating transit through the strait, issued its own map to navigate around the mines and plans to accept toll payments in cryptocurrency. Worse yet, Trump launched a joint US-Iranian venture to manage traffic through the strait, and may personally benefit from toll fees collected in cryptocurrency.

Rapid or extensive progress in the talks is not realistic. In previous rounds of negotiations with Iran, both Republican and Democratic governments refused to seek a comprehensive agreement that included Iran's nuclear capabilities, missile arsenal and the threat of terrorism. After years of talks, the Obama administration secured the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and addressed missile and terrorism issues separately through sanctions and other non-military means.

Some in Trump's orbit now argue that, given the extensive damage the United States and Israel have done to these three aspects of Iran's regional threats, now is precisely the time to force Tehran to make comprehensive and verifiable commitments on all issues. But Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz adds a fourth pillar that has emboldened Iranian leaders. Securing worthwhile compromises on all of these issues – not to mention the regime's abhorrent repression of the Iranian people – is simply not in the cards in the time left for a ceasefire.

World leaders understand this bleak picture and are not counting on the United States for a quick solution. The Iranian theocracy will survive, for now. Even as Iranian missiles and drones continued to target civilian energy infrastructure after the ceasefire, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman accepted a call from the Iranian president, as did Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Other US allies and partners were already working directly with Tehran to achieve safe passage through the strait, including India, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Instead of launching Social Truth tirades against NATO and other US allies, Trump should work through America's longstanding network of allies to strengthen his position. Most of our allies do not want to go back to war, but they also do not want to see a vengeful and empowered regime in Iran rebuild its nuclear and missile arsenal while threatening the global economy.

American allies are now essential, as is a more flexible schedule. Trump needs your help to chart a path that builds on the military campaign with civilian tools and multilateral pressure, and resists the temptation to cut self-serving bilateral agreements with Tehran.

American and Israeli fighters prepared this weekend's political opening, but the next phase should not fall solely to them as a last resort. The president who prides himself on making deals should give this process more than two weeks.

Dana L. Stroul is director of research at the Washington Institute and served as deputy assistant secretary of dDefense for the Middle East in 2021-23.

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