The killing of senior Hamas officials in an Israeli missile strike in Beirut on Tuesday reverberated across the Middle East. Although many people have been killed every day for almost three months, the latest targeted killing caused shock, opened old wounds and sparked fears of an escalation of the conflict.
Among the victims of the surgical strike were senior Hamas leaders. The most prominent was Saleh al-Arouri, a former leader of the Qassam Brigades and a member of Hamas’s political bureau who coordinated the group’s military and political activities outside the Gaza Strip, gathering political and financial support. Originally from the West Bank, al-Arouri was reportedly one of the most popular Hamas leaders in the Fatah-led parts of Palestine, and his reputation may have grown after October 7.
Senior military commanders Samir Findi and Azzam al-Aqraa were also killed, along with four other officers.
The assassination bore all the signs of classic Israeli long-range targeted eliminations of high-value human targets. Al-Arouri and his companions were killed in an attack that targeted a second-floor apartment on the street, flanked on both sides by eight-story-high buildings. The action had striking similarities to the assassination of Ahmad Yassin, one of the founders of Hamas and the group’s spiritual leader, who was eliminated on a Gaza street by a modified anti-tank guided missile.
Times and technology change, as do Israeli capabilities. To kill Sheikh Yassin in 2004, an AH-64 Apache armored anti-tank helicopter needed to get within 2 kilometers (1.2 miles). The same task is now performed by smaller, quieter unmanned drones that are harder to hear and see, and a new generation of missiles. The combination used in Beirut, which was not detected, appears to have been an Israeli-built system: a Hermes drone and a Nimrod missile.
The attack also evoked unpleasant memories of previous incursions and military actions in Beirut that Israel carried out with impunity. One of the most notorious clandestine assassinations occurred 50 years ago, in April 1973, when an Israeli commando team landed on the beach in Beirut and killed three senior Palestinian leaders. The Israeli team included future Prime Minister Ehud Barak, wearing the dress and makeup of a young blonde. In a chilling parallel to Tuesday’s assassination, the main target was the military leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the West Bank, Kamal Adwan.
Israel reaped the rewards of the so-called Spring of Youth action for years, as it polarized Lebanon so deeply that it led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saeb Salam, followed by armed clashes between pro-Palestinian factions and their opponents and a general collapse of the political situation. and security situation. After two years of a spiral of mistrust, broken promises, false loyalties and infighting, Lebanon descended into a bloody and exhaustive civil war that would not end until 1990. Israel used the infighting for its objectives, fueling the war, arming their representatives and encouraging and instigating. massacres such as those of Sabra and Chatila in 1982.
Examples from the past are terrifying, but history does not always have to repeat itself, especially for those who learn from the past.
The first questions an analyst asks are: why him, why now, and what will happen next.
“Why him” is somewhat of a moot question, but it still needs to be asked. In principle, Israel wants to eliminate as many senior Hamas officials as possible, after October 7, probably with even more determination. Al-Arouri was a very high-ranking Hamas official, influential and capable, different from the rest of the senior leadership by reportedly being independent-minded.
Having lived for a long time outside Palestine, in Turkey and Lebanon, he developed his own international contacts and networks. Israel, with its usually excellent intelligence, must have been aware of his capabilities and perhaps his plans that are still publicly unknown. If al-Arouri was killed for any political reason, it could probably be because of his close and frequent physical contacts with Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and the numerous Iranian political and military representatives present in southern Beirut. He probably interacted with them daily, like a trusted partner. In that role, it will be difficult for Hamas to replace him immediately.
“Because right now?” is probably the key question. There is no doubt that Israel was immediately aware of its installation in Beirut in 2015, after years of movement; Although all Hamas leaders follow strict security routines, these were surely more relaxed before October 7, and there would have been plenty of opportunities to assassinate him beforehand.
Both Hezbollah and its protector and sponsor, Iran, have shown remarkable political restraint and patience in not rushing to attack Israel after it began bombing and then attacking Gaza. Israel’s initial calculation had to consider the possibility that Hezbollah would open a second front, but after almost three months of relative calm in the north, Israeli forces allowed themselves to demobilize five brigades, obviously convinced that, whatever fighting will have to fight in the future, It will be on the fringe.
But many prominent Israeli politicians, generals and influencers have been warning that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not agree with the generals. Rather, he may consider the continuation of the war to be in his direct interest.
“The Netanyahu government does not want this war to end. Politically, Netanyahu has a major problem the next day. [the war ends] since that is when investigations into the failures on the Israeli side will begin,” former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy warned just a few days ago.
If you fear the end of the war, why not delay it into the future and prolong it? Why not open another front in the north, have more men and women in uniform, keep the country on a war footing, preventing citizens and politicians from asking unpleasant questions? Why not take advantage of the convenient opportunity to prolong the atmosphere in which far-right politicians, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, can continue to advocate extreme views such as the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the resettlement of Israelis? All of this would be consistent with the Israeli prime minister’s behavior, say experienced Netanyahu observers.
The big question now is whether Hezbollah will take the obvious bait. A senior Iranian delegation including several senior generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly flew to Beirut on Wednesday. Nasrallah apparently canceled his previously announced speech for Thursday, releasing on Wednesday a recorded speech in which he reiterated his usual warnings to Hezbollah’s enemies, but without revealing any concrete decisions. He is almost certainly now consulting with his Iranian allies about Hezbollah’s eventual reaction to the Beirut killings.
The answer to “what happens next” could emerge from those meetings.
