Meals at Michelin-starred restaurants. Designer handbags by Dolce & Gabbana and Louis Vuitton. More than $37,000 in cash in “covert financing” to an account she controlled at a think tank.
These are some of the advantages that Sue my TerryA naturalized U.S. citizen who worked for the CIA before establishing herself as a foreign policy expert, was paid in exchange for secretly helping South Korean spies, federal prosecutors said in a 31-page document. accusation Unsealed last week.
Many of his alleged activities — which included helping his handlers gain access to U.S. officials and promoting talking points they gave him — were no different from those of many others. foreign lobbyists She was working in the United States. What got her into trouble was her failure to identify herself as such to the government, as required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
The case, which could land Terry in prison for 10 years, has gripped Washington's foreign policy world.
But in South Korea, the allegation has left the government and intelligence experts wondering how the country's spies could have been so careless.
In a meeting with South Korean reporters, an official from the office of President Yoon Suk-yeola conservative, accused Yoon's liberal predecessor of filling the country's National Intelligence Service with amateurs.
“This is a situation that requires an audit or accountability measures against the Moon Jae-in administration,” the official said.
But as Yoon's opponents have pointed out, Terry's alleged crimes spanned a decade and aligned with three consecutive South Korean administrations, including that of Yoon, who takes office in 2022.
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That Allies spy on each other It is an open secret. The scandal only breaks out when indiscretions come to light.
Among the lesser-known revelations in the 2013 leak by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were documents suggesting the US was spying on the embassies of its allies, including South Korea.
Another controversy erupted last year with a leak of Pentagon classified documents indicating that the United States may have been spying on South Korea's presidential office.
In truth, most of the work spies do in allied countries is boring, said Chae Seong-joon, a former South Korean intelligence officer.
“It’s more or less a mutually agreed upon personnel exchange,” he said. “For example, CIA agents here in South Korea may appear publicly as employees of the U.S. Embassy, but the South Korean government knows who they really are.”
Unlike spies who are sent into hostile territories under false identities, they operate under the assumption that they are being monitored by local security forces at all times. As such, they spend most of their time keeping abreast of local developments and gathering information from sources in ways that do not draw too much attention from their hosts.
Terry, 54, who has held influential positions at foreign policy think tanks and has frequently written opinion pieces for American publications, including the Los Angeles Times newspaperwould have been an especially attractive source.
Born in Seoul and raised in Hawaii and Virginia, she worked as a Korean affairs analyst at the CIA from 2001 to 2008, according to her (now-deleted) biography, at the Wilson Center, a Washington think tank where she worked from 2021 to 2023. She has also held senior positions on the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Council.
That background gave him public credibility and access to high-level US officials.
Last year, according to the indictment, Terry was writing articles under the direction of his South Korean contacts.
These include an article last year in Foreign Affairs that argued the United States should introduce “more nuclear-capable weapons systems to South Korea, such as the B-52 and F-35,” and establish a nuclear “consultative group” — ideas that federal prosecutors said reflected the Yoon administration’s policy preferences.
In a statement, Terry's attorney Lee Wolosky said the U.S. government had made “a significant mistake.”
“The allegations are baseless and distort the work of an academic and news analyst known for her independence and years of service to the United States,” he said, adding that Terry has not had a security clearance for more than a decade.
“In fact, she was a harsh critic of the South Korean government during the times when, according to this indictment, she acted on its behalf,” the statement said.
The Council on Foreign Relations, Terry's current employer, has placed her on unpaid administrative leave, according to her biography on its website.
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Terry's appeal as a source for South Korean agents was apparent to U.S. officials as early as 2014.
FBI agents warned her in November that South Korean intelligence agents might try to approach her. During that meeting, Terry “became visibly nervous, changed her speech pattern, and began stuttering and fidgeting in her seat,” the indictment says.
Recruiting such an obvious source was the first mistake by South Korean agents, said Nam Sung-wook, a North Korea expert at Korea University in Seoul and a former director of the South Korean spy agency's research arm.
“He was someone they should have specifically avoided,” he said. “This is what happens when you send poorly trained agents with poor English skills: They end up trying to work only with Korean-born sources who can speak Korean. Of course, that’s going to get the FBI’s attention.”
Chae, the former intelligence officer, said Terry's handlers failed to take basic steps to cover their tracks.
In June 2022, after Terry attended a private “off-the-record” meeting that included Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, senior State Department officials and several other Korea policy experts, a South Korean agent in a car registered to the South Korean Embassy picked her up and photographed her handwritten notes, according to the indictment.
A few weeks later, Terry hosted a happy hour for congressional staffers, funded by South Korea’s spy agency, attended by one of its agents posing as a diplomat, according to the indictment. He allegedly described the action to FBI agents as “bringing in the wolf.”
“It was extremely negligent of the officer to personally attend events like that,” Chae said. “That would be considered a breach of protocol even for activities on South Korean soil.”
The indictment also includes a photograph of Terry dining with suspected South Korean spies at an “upscale Greek restaurant” in Manhattan, unaware they were being watched, as well as an image from surveillance video showing an alleged handler purchasing a $2,950 Bottega Veneta handbag and delivering it to her at a store in Washington.
South Korean intelligence officials also allegedly rewarded Terry for her cooperation with checks from the South Korean Embassy totaling $37,035 that were deposited into an “unrestricted gift account” she controlled at the Wilson Center.
The Wilson Center declined to answer questions about the account or how the money was spent.
“The Wilson Center is not a target of the investigation and has fully cooperated with law enforcement authorities,” a spokesperson said in an email.
In Washington foreign policy circles, Terry's indictment is seen as a warning to other foreign spies and their sources in the United States.
“It seems the authorities decided to make a public example of his case because it was particularly riddled with errors on both sides,” said a former Wilson Center fellow who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
And while it's embarrassing for South Korea's spy agency, experts said it's unlikely to cause any problems. relations between Washington and Seoul.
“Such problems are always resolved through back channels,” Nam said. “Intelligence agents related to the case will probably be called back to Seoul. The two governments will have a discussion and that will be the end of it.”