To say that President-elect Donald Trump has many plans for his second term would be a gross understatement. He has promised to implement the largest deportation operation in US history, secure the US-Mexico border and negotiate a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia.
For Trump, however, all of these issues may be minor compared to another issue: solving the North Korean nuclear conundrum. Taking Pyongyang's nuclear program off the board is Trump's proverbial white whale, a feat none of his predecessors managed to accomplish. Members of Trump's inner circle told Reuters in late November that the next president was already talking about restart personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that had begun during his first term.
Talking is one thing and reality is another. If Trump comes into office thinking he can easily resurrect his relationship with Kim, then he will risk disappointment. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue was difficult five years ago, but it will be even more difficult today.
During his first term, Trump was able to push for personal engagement with the North Korean head of state despite resistance among his national security advisers. This was the right decision at the time. After all, bottom-up attempts by the Bush and Obama administrations to negotiate with Pyongyang turned out to be laborious and unsuccessful.
After almost a year of fire-breathing rhetoric and talk about a “bloody nose“An attack that would scare Pyongyang into entering into talks, Trump chose to go for direct diplomacy. This was partly because his other options (more economic sanctions or military action) ranged from ineffective to disastrous, and partly because the then South Korean President Moon Jae-in was able to convince Trump that a direct channel of communication with Kim could be the key to cementing a historically important nuclear deal.
Despite three meetings between Trump and Kim, face-to-face diplomacy failed to produce anything long-term. While Trump managed to conquer North Korea suspend missile tests for a year: no small achievement given your past activity – the striking summit finally crashed and burned. In the end, Trump and Kim, despite their personal chemistry, they couldn't reach an agreement — Trump, urged by his hardline advisors, advocated for the complete denuclearization of North Korea; Meanwhile, Kim was only willing to demobilize his main plutonium research facility at Yongbyon.
Diplomacy between the United States and North Korea has been dead ever since. The Biden administration's overtures toward Pyongyang over the past four years have been repeatedly rejected, apparently as a consequence of what North Korean leaders consider a lack of seriousness on the part of Washington, as well as U.S. attempts to solidify a military relationship. trilateral between the two countries. United States, South Korea and Japan.
In other words, on January 20, North Korea's perennial nuclear problem will be thornier than ever. And it's probably thornier: Kim is far less desperate for a nuclear deal and an end to U.S. sanctions now than he was during the first Trump administration.
First, Kim has not forgotten his previous meetings with Trump. He considers the 2018 and 2019 summits to be at best a waste of time and at worst a personal humiliation. This shouldn't be a surprise; The North Korean dictator bet significant capital on negotiating a deal to lift US sanctions and normalize relations between Pyongyang and the United States. Their pleas failed on both counts. Three summits later, American sanctions remained intact and relations between the United States and North Korea remained at their usual acrimony.
Kim will be more cautious this time. “We have already explored all possible avenues to negotiate with the United States.” said in Novemberadding that the result had been further American aggression. And in a December speech, he promised to launch the “hardest counterattacks” against the United States, an expression of his commitment to resisting what he perceives as a hostile bloc backed by Washington.
The geopolitical environment has also evolved. In 2018-2019, North Korea was isolated and lifting US sanctions was seen as critical to its economic growth.
But now Putin's war in Ukraine has given the Kim regime a golden opportunity to diversify its foreign relations away from China. approaching Moscow, among other things, sending thousands of North Korean troops to the front between Ukraine and Russia. Russia, which used to be a partner in the United States' desire to denuclearize North Korea, is now using North Korea as a way to thwart America's grand ambitions in East Asia.
For Kim, the advantages of his relationship with Russia are equally clear: Putin needs weapons and men; Kim needs cash and military technology. And thanks to Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, additional sanctions are a pipe dream for the foreseeable future, while those already on the books are meekly enforced. As long as the Russia-North Korea relationship continues at the current pace, it will be difficult for Trump to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.
None of this suggests that Trump should not attempt another diplomatic foray with North Korea. Regardless of the criticism he received at the time, Trump's decision to turn things around and go straight to the source was an admirable attempt to manage an issue that has challenged American presidents for more than three decades.
However, if Trump wants a second roll of the dice, he needs to keep a healthy dose of skepticism in mind. Given the continued improvement of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, any deal the United States signs with the Kim regime will be less impressive than it might have been in 2019, assuming we reach a deal.
Daniel R. DePetris is a Defense Priorities fellow and a foreign affairs commentator for the Spectator..
