You can understand why President Biden, after taking political risks for Israel for months, reportedly frustrated with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rockets were still falling on Tel Aviv when Biden visited Israel to show their support. Sent US armed forces to the region to discourage Hezbollah and, more recently, defeat support Houthi piracy. He pushed for thousands of millions of dollars in additional military aid and backed Israel's war in Gaza even as it became increasingly unpopular.
In return, Biden has asked Netanyahu to commit to a Palestinian state once the war between Israel and Hamas ends. And Netanyahu just said publicly No.
The United States is now reported to be actively attractive with other leaders and parties in Israel about the future of Gaza and the Palestinians in general. The problem is that opposition to a Palestinian state extends far beyond the prime minister's office.
It is undeniable that Netanyahu has his own reasons for rejecting a Palestinian state. His government has the support of far-right parties that advocate expel Gazans en masse from the strip. If he backed Palestinian statehood, the coalition would shatter and his government would collapse. AND surveys suggest that if new elections are held, Netanyahu will be out of a job and face legal issues.
“Then there are the broader practicalities of implementing a two-state solution, demarcating everything from water rights to airspace and demarcating geography.”from the river to the sea”without dividing Israel in the process. The biggest political problems would be the relocation of the 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the eternal challenge of dealing with Jerusalem.
But there is also something deeper behind Netanyahu's opposition: a fundamentally different conception of the root cause of the October 7 massacre and the current war.
In the American narrative, the context of October 7 is the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process of the 1990s. In this narrative, Israel “cutting the grass“This approach – killing militants without simultaneously providing Palestinians with real political or economic opportunities – was destined to fail. Therefore, peace begins by providing those opportunities and a path to a two-state solution.
In the Israeli version of events, the mistake was Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, which gave Hamas a sanctuary to plan, train and ultimately launch a relatively unimpeded attack on Israel. Israel points out that not only allowed but encouraged Qatar will funnel money to Gaza to improve living conditions, some of which was likely spent on weapons. Israel also maintains that work permit Allowing thousands of Gazans to earn higher salaries in Israel became a means for Hamas to gather intelligence.
In Israel's view, a two-state solution would only exacerbate this problem. The Palestinian Authority is widely seen as weak and corrupt; nearly 9 out of 10 The Palestinians want their president, Mahmoud Abbas, to resign. Meanwhile, 57% of Gazans and 82% of West Bank Palestinians approved of Hamas' attack in October, and overall support for the group has increased in both regions.
So, Israel asks, what would stop Hamas or a similar group from usurping control of a Palestinian state as they did in Gaza?
This is not only Netanyahu's opinion but also that of Israelis. Israeli support for a two-state solution has been declining for a decade, according to the Pew Research Center. In a poll taken several months before the Hamas attack, just 35% of Israelis thought that two states could “coexist peacefully.” As Israeli President Isaac Herzog said commented recently in Davos, No Israeli “in their right mind” is willing to think about peace agreements. Even if Netanyahu were to leave the political scene, that Israeli opposition could remain.
This leaves the United States with few levers to pull. You can offer plans to redraw the map, but that won't get to the heart of the matter. You can promise incentives like standardization of relations with Saudi Arabia, but the fear of another October 7 will prevail over any potential benefits. Conditions may be imposed on US military aidbut that can exacerbate Israeli insecurities and, as a consequence, intransigence.
Maybe the way to go is to start smaller. Like Herzog noted, the average Israeli “wants to know: Can we be promised real security in the future?” After the trauma of October 7, it will take time to build that trust. But his framing indicates where to start.
From Israel military leaders They have argued that their security requires planning for the end of the war and the reconstruction of Gaza. Netanyahu has resisted any such discussion, but American pressure could change their calculations. If done well, reconstruction could foster the mutual trust necessary for a more lasting political settlement.
That incrementalism is sure to frustrate everyone: certainly Palestinians who yearn for statehood, as well as right-wing Israelis who resist any idea of rebuilding Gaza, but also the Biden administration, which would prefer a big victory this year. electoral. But like many past presidents, Biden is learning that while the dynamics of the Middle East may change, frustration is a constant.
Raphael S. Cohen is the director of Rand Corp.'s Air Force Project Strategy and Doctrine Program.
