In Social Truth Earlier this month, President Trump ordered Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to “prepare for possible action” to protect Christians in Nigeria. (Hegseth's social communication answer: “Yes sir”). The order appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by a statement from Senator Ted Cruz last month accusing the Nigerian government of “ignoring and even facilitating the mass murder of Christians by Islamist jihadists.” For a former career USAID Foreign Service officer, which included more than three years in Nigeria, the most interesting part of the order was the president's threat to “stop all aid and assistance” to Nigeria.
As I sat at my desk in Northern Virginia, having filed another unemployment insurance claim after being illegally fired in July, I wondered: What helps? If the president was referring to military funding, it would seem contradictory to cut money explicitly designated for fight terrorism in Nigeria. He was more certain that it was not the aid he used to administer, since shortly after Trump took office in January he arrogated to himself powers in Congress and allowed Elon Musk and others in the newly formed Department of Government Efficiency cut it.
One of the more than 5,000 programs that were effectively canceled by DOGE helped Nigerians make modest but significant progress against conflict and extremism in northern Nigeria. Designated as Community Initiatives to Promote Peace, the initial phases of the program lasted until 2024. It was eventually phased out before its expansion began in 2025. The curriculum trained respected community elders (usually local religious or tribal leaders) in conflict resolution and facilitated dialogue sessions between conflicting groups, such as Christian farmers and Muslim pastors.
We designed the project in the same way that medical researchers conduct vaccine trials: we divided potential recipients into two groups, a “treatment” group that received training and discussion sessions and a control group that did not. We then randomly sampled the opinions of people in both groups to see if the results produced a statistically significant difference.
The results were impressive. After six months, when the groups were asked if their communities had experienced a violent event, only 10% of people in communities that received negotiation training and dialogue meetings said yes, compared to 41% of people in communities that had not. Nigerians in the treatment group reported feeling safer, more likely to walk around their communities, and less likely to avoid certain areas than those in the control group.
This work was complemented by grants to local Catholic, Evangelical, and Muslim organizations to expand their ability to peacefully mediate conflicts. I spent dozens of hours training a brave Catholic organization in the hotspot of Kaduna in the mundane but necessary work (computerized accounting, activity documentation) to professionalize its operations. As a result, he was able to expand his conflict resolution work to more villages.
However, in the context of a physically vast and deeply conflicted country like Nigeria, our work in a few dozen communities could very much be characterized as a pilot program, as we often lamented at the time. In response, we moved forward with training state-level government officials and others responsible for broader geographic areas to institutionalize knowledge so that further assistance would not be necessary. We were also exploring ways to connect our on-the-ground efforts with social media influencers for greater publicity and impact.
Then, in early February, Musk spent a weekend feeding USAID in a wood chipper. What remains in the political toolbox, Trump has apparently decided, is to send the military to Nigeria with “firearms.” The limits of this approach in Nigeria became clear in May 2023, when a US convoy traveling through southeastern Nigeria was ambushed. The identity and motive of the attackers remain unclear.
The incident was notable for its brutality, with the victims (two American consulate employees and two Nigerian police officers) horribly burned beyond recognition inside their vehicles after their vehicles were checked by shooting. Three others were kidnapped.
Two suspects were quickly arrested, although it is still unclear how they were linked to the attack, and it is not yet publicly known whether they have been tried and convicted. Even more alarming is that, despite extensive intelligence sharing between the US and Nigerian governments, no further arrests have been announced. If “the shooting” involves known targets, it doesn't seem promising that we haven't had much success finding the perpetrators who killed US government employees and burned US armored vehicles.
USAID's conflict resolution work points to a broader truth about foreign aid that complicates the simplistic binary that is often presented: that it is either selfless charity or uncontrolled “woke” spending. USAID seriously understood its role as something else entirely: implementers of a tool in the US government's foreign policy toolbox. Sometimes we weren't the right tool for the job; the violent force was. This was as true a reality in Nigeria as anywhere else.
Wise leaders understand which tool, or combination of tools, and in what quantity to apply them to achieve their objectives. For anyone genuinely concerned about the plight of Christians in Nigeria, it is deeply unfortunate that the US government is no longer counting on its considerable foreign aid budget as part of its engagement with the Nigerian government on the issue.
Today, in the courtyard of the US embassy in Abuja, a small tree stands next to a plaque solemnly honoring those killed. It was planted in an emotional ceremony during which surviving family members spoke of their loved ones' dedication and pride in supporting the United States' good work in Nigeria. Now, like the rest of Nigeria, they could soon suffer an American invasion. Americans could experience, probably not for the last time, what happens after we – some of us joyfully – lose one of the most effective tools we possessed for achieving peace.
Daniel Morris, a former U.S. diplomat, was USAID's senior conflict advisor in Abuja, Nigeria, from 2020 to 2024.
