Collaborator: The Middle East has changed since Trump's first mandate. How will it remode it?


As President Trump parades through the Middle East this week, he will encounter a very different region than the one he experienced during his first term. It is true that the Israeli-Palestinian problem is still unresolved, as are the challenges that emanate from the very advanced nuclear program and instability and dysfunction in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

But this old man was now packaged in new bottles. Beyond striking headlines From the Trump plan to accept a Boeing 747 as a gift of Qatar, new trends are emerging that will redefine the region, raising additional challenges for US politics.

Of all the changes in the Middle East from the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, against Israel, perhaps the most surprising is the emergence of Israel as a regional power. Aided by the administrations of the Presidents Biden and Trump, and enabled by the Arab regimes that are little to support the Palestinians, Israel devastated Hamas and Hezbollah as military organizations, killing a large part of their high -level leadership. With the support of the United States, Europe and the friendly Arab states, effectively counteracted Two direct Iranian missile attacks in their territory.

Israel then delivered its own strike, as reported Destroyer Much of the production of Balistic missiles of Iran and the aerial defenses. In summary, Israel has achieved mastery of climbing: the ability to intensify (or not) as it considers it convenient, and deter its adversaries. Israel also has redefined His concept of border security in Gaza, Lebanon, Bank and Syria acting unilaterally to avoid and avoid threats to their territory.

Converting Israel's military power into political agreements, including peace agreements, would seem a reasonable next step. But the right -wing government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to be interested in such options and is unlikely to be induced to change his perspective. In addition, ensuring new lasting agreements also depends on whether there are leaders between the Palestinians and the key Arab states ready to assume the challenge, with all the political risks it implies.

But the Arab world remains in a serious disorder. At least five Arab states are dealing with deep internal challenges, leaving them in various degrees of dysfunction and state failure. In the midst of this power vacuum, two alternative power centers have emerged. The first are the states of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Relatively unscathed by Arab spring and blessed with funds of sovereign wealth, oil and natural gas, these stable authoritarian powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, have begun to play a huge role in the region.

The second category includes non -Arab states. Israel, Türkiye and Iran are the only states of the region with the ability to project significant military power beyond its borders. While each one has suffered periods of internal disturbances, they currently enjoy domestic stability. Each also has enormous economic potential and significant security, military and intelligence capacities, including the ability to manufacture weapons nationwide.

One (Israel) is the closest regional ally in the United States, another (Turkey) is a member of NATO and a new energy corridor in Syria, and the third (Iran) retains considerable influence despite the fact that Israel of its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies. Iran's nuclear program keeps it relevant, even central, both for the formulation of Israeli and American policies.

The three non -Arab states generate great suspicion and distrust between the Arab regimes, but they are nevertheless seen as key players to whom nobody wants to offend. The three of them disagree, with each one frustrating the regional objectives of others, and the three are here to stay. It is very likely that its influence only grows in the coming years, given the fracture of the Arab world.

Immediately after the Hamas attack of October 7, it seemed that the Palestinian problem was once again in front and the center, not only in the Arab world, but internationally. Those who claimed that they had lost their resonance could point out the effusion of sympathy and support to Gazán's civilians, since Israel's war against Hamas led to a humanitarian catastrophe.

In addition, the United Nations passed resolution Asking for the end of the war, many worldwide condemned war and Israel, the International Court of Justice took the ask If Israel is committing genocide and the International Criminal Court issued An arrest warrant for Netanyahu (as well as for the Military Commander of Hamas, who was later killed).

However, it has become incredibly clear that, far from pushing the Palestinian issue to the top of the international agenda, the October 7 attack has actually decreased its relevance and left the Palestinians isolated and without good options. The continuous support of the United States to the Israel War against Hamas, despite the exponential rise of Palestinian deaths, has protected Israel with negative consequences; The key Arab regimes have almost nothing to impose costs and consequences on Israel and the United States as Palestinian civil deaths assemble. The international community seems too fragmented, distracted and interested in itself to act in a concerted manner in defense of Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian National Movement remains divided and dysfunctional, giving the Palestinians an unpleasant election between Hamas and the aging president of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. The perspectives of anything that looks like a solution of two states have never been more gloomy.

It remains to be seen how the Trump administration will process these developments. Clearly, he has adopted a Pro-Israel vision, with Trump reflecting on turning Gaza into a Riviera style resort. He has displayed His special envoy to the Middle East to ensure the return of the hostages taken by Hamas, but has not yet invested in any postwar plan for the besieged enclave. In fact, he has left Gaza's strategy to Israel, which in turn has resumed his military campaign there. Trump has also accepted the search for Israel of aggressive border defenses against Lebanon and Syria, while allowing Israel's annexationist policies in the West Bank.

However, Trump is nothing if not unpredictable. In April, he announced New negotiations from the United States with Iran in the presence of Netanyahu, who has tried to persuade the president that the only solution to Iran's nuclear program is military action. But if US-Iranian negotiations advance, or if Trump's interest in Israeli-Saudite normalization intensifies, it can be attracted to the Bazaar of the Middle East negotiation, dealing with the intricate of the planning of the day in Gaza and a political horizon for the newspapers.

These paths are already promoting the tension between Trump, who He will not visit Israel on his journey from the Middle East, and a Netanyahu recalcitrant. But given Trump's absolute control over his party, Netanyahu will have few options to attract Republicans if the White House proposes policies to which he opposes. As most Americans have already learned, if Trump wants something, it is not reluctant to use pressure to obtain it.

Aaron David Miller, main member of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a former analyst and negotiator of the Middle East in Republican and Democratic Administrations and author of “”The end of greatness: why the United States cannot have (and does not want) another great president. “Lauren Morganbesser is a junior member at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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