After the United States attack against Iran's main nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan, Tehran faces nothing more than bad options. Military, Iran can increase the conflict by attacking American forces and allies in the region, as he did on Monday with missile attacks in the US bases in Qatar and Iraq. Iran could also close the hormuk Strait, withdraw from the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty or even try a rapid “break” to a pump with its residual capacities. Each of these options practically ensures an American military response that goes far beyond Iran's nuclear program, possibly leading to a specific campaign to overthrow the regime, the largest nightmare of the Islamic Republic.
Therefore, a more likely military response would be that Iran responded by attacking Israel, as he did only a few hours after the United States strike, an attempt to turn the conflict into a war of wear that Israel cannot pay. Israel could be intensified to try to end the war faster and avoid prolonged losses.
Diplomatically, Iran can return to negotiations, but rejecting the demand of President Trump of an “unconditional surrender”, whose terms had not explained. Actually, this would probably include the complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear and missile programs and significant curbs to their regional role, together with long -term and more inspections. If Tehran rejected these demands, it would greatly increase the risk of more US military actions, even against the regime itself, aimed at military and civil infrastructure, not only in nuclear sites.
Alternatively, it can essentially access Trump's demands, in which case he avoids direct American intervention and the end of the war, but Iran loses his final security guarantor, nuclear capacity, and practically all his leverage to seek concessions in new international conversations. The regime would also seem so weak that the probability of a domestic lifting would increase exponentially.
Whatever the option that Iran chosen, the future of the Islamic Republic has never been at greater risk. Consequently, the perspectives of a dramatic positive transformation of the strategic landscape of the Middle East have never been greater.
The American decades effort to establish a regional coalition of Arab states and Israel, to contain Iran, will be given a significant impulse, since the first gains confidence to do it in front of a very weakened and resurgent Iran in the region. The dangers of proliferation, at least in the Middle East, could be reduced considerably. Israel will have demonstrated, although this time only with critical American assistance, that the “beginning doctrine” (Israeli determination of taking all means necessary to prevent a regional hostile state from developing nuclear weapons) still applies. Türkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the three most likely prolifemen in the region after Iran, will have few reasons to pursue nuclear weapons.
The inability of Russia and China to provide its Iranian ally with any practical support during the war in marked contrast with the United States and Israel and is particularly irritating to Iran due to their strong support for Kremlin during the Russian war in Ukraine. Moscow and Beijing will suffer a significant reduction in their regional position, accumulated for the benefit of Washington. The Middle East will be considered a region clearly dominated by Americans, in which Russia and China will have to step more carefully.
There are some in the United States who fear that the conflicts of the Middle East distract American attention from competition with China, the only nation that is close to the economic influence of the United States today, and Russia. But assume a direct role in this conflict from Iran-Israel No He diverted the American approach to Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, it has significantly strengthened Washington's global stature compared to both countries. China will hesitate to attack Taiwan now that the United States has demonstrated the will to bomb the aggressors against American allies.
An Israel whose enemies have weakened dramatically, and who no longer faces an existential threat of Iran, would be in a much better position to advance in the Palestinian issue, beginning with the end of the war in Gaza. In fact, it would not be unreasonable to assume that Trump, always transactional, may have made this a previous condition for his support for Israel in the war. Saudi-Israeli standardization will be on the table again.
Netanyahu has prepared for this moment for 30 years, for the opportunity to end the only existential threat that Israel continues to face. Of the vilified leader whose administration allowed the Fiasco on October 7 And several outrages in domestic affairs, now it is to be remembered as one of Israel's great heroes. In addition, a result favorable to war can save it from what otherwise seems to have been an imminent electoral defeat, which could have been followed by jail time, given the positions of corruption it faces.
The most important question is whether Netanyahu, whose deep understanding of Israel's general strategic circumstances has never hesitated, wish to take this opportunity to crown his legacy not only to save Israel from an existential military threat, but also of an almost equally severe demographic challenge to his own future as a Jewish and Democratic state. Fordo may have gone; The Palestinians remain. It would really consolidate its position in history if the Gaza War ends and paved the way to a resolution of the Palestinian theme.
Both Netanyahu and Trump deserve credit for taking daring measures, and must be prepared to continue doing so. This is not the time to be weak, but to continue pressing the advantage. They have been involved in a classic case of coercive diplomacy, the use of military force for diplomatic purposes, and must see it until the desired end: a diplomatic agreement with Iran that guarantees, with a regime of inspections of the unprecedented intrusivity, which can never again develop nuclear capabilities for military purposes, puts limitations on its missile abilities and the curtains of its malignant region.
Even with a high tentative fire in its place, achieving such an agreement will not be easy. It is unlikely that Iranians completely access US demands unless they really feel the wall support, and even then, they are unusually effective negotiators. The persistence, focus and attention of details, it is not known that Trump's forte will be requested, will now be called. A historical opening has been carried out; It should not be wasted.
Chuck Freilich, former National Security Advisor Israeli, is the main member of the Institute for National Security Studies of Israel. Colin P. Clarke is the Director of Research at The Soufan Group, a security and intelligence consulting firm based in New York City.
